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ABSTRACT
The current changes in business settings have directed companies to conduct businesses at the international level which
requires the use offinancial instruments.The mandatory MFRS 7, an adoption of nnsT standard has been implementedfor
entities to disclose their involvement with financial instruments . Thus , the aim of this study is to investigate the financial
instruments disclosure practices (rn) among Malaysian listed companies; specifically, on the level of compliance
wiilt urns 7. The overall results indicate that corppanies complied with urns 7, though there are several requirements
omittedby companies.Furtlrcrmore,with the revision of Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (uccc) in2012,this
study examines the association of corporate governance mechanisms (board expertise, audit committee independence,
audit fee, external and internal audit functions) with the extent of rto among companies. Based on a total sample of
319 Malaysian public listed companies for financial year end 2012, the analysis reveals that FID is significantly and
positively associated with audit committee independence and external audit functions, while internal audit is negatively
associated. Hence, it suggests that effective corporafe governance is crucial as this is likely to have some influence on
the extent of disclosure level among companies.
Keywords: MFRS 7 ; .financial instruments; financial instrument disclosure practice ; corporate governance
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there have been signiflcant developments
of more complex and innovative financial instruments to
cater for the needs of current business world (Zadeh &
Eskandari 2012; Hunzker 2013). Financial instruments,
either equity-based (l.e. shares) or debt-based (i.e.
derivatives) are widely used by companies as a medium
to raise more capital (Ismail & Rahman 2011). New risk
management techniques and concepts have evolved for
identifying, evaluating, and managing the exposure of risk
arising from the financial instruments. Thus, there is a need
for more relevant information on and greater transparency
of an entity's exposure in managing and controlling those
risks (Zaluki & Hussin 2009). Potential stakeholders,
particularly investors, are demanding such high quality
information in order to make more informed decisions.
For this reason, in August 2005, the International
Accounting Standards Board (hss) issued International
Financial Reporting Standards (Irns) 7 on financial
instruments to provide guidelines to the extent of the
disclosure required for entities involved with financial
instruments. Previously, financial instruments disclosure
was catered for under either ras 30 Disclosure in the
Financial Statements of Banks and similar Financial
Institutions or IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Disclosure
and Presentation. However, the IASB removed these
duplicated disclosures as part of their revision, and
simplif,ed them to a single concentration standard known
as IFRS 7. Irns 7 defines a flnancial instrument as any
contract that gives rise to a financial asset ofone entity and
a financial liability or equity instrument of another entity.
ln line with international developments on this matter,
Malaysian companies are also required to adhere to the
regulation set by the Malaysian Accounting Standards
Board (msr). The rraesn is the sole authority dealing
with accounting standards in Malaysia. It has issued
Malaysian Financial Reporting Standards (urns), fully
tms-compliant standards, in orderto be alignedwith global
accounting standardisation efforts. The fuIl convergence
process came into effect on 1 January 2012 and is to be
applied by all Entities Other Than Private Entities (rraasn
2011). The convergence with Ims, although challenging,
will place Malaysian companies and the capital market at
par with other international economies and markets (The
Accountant 2008). Thus, firms that comply with ltrns
standards would be expected to produce high quality
accounting information, as numerous studies (Liu, Yao,
Hu & Liu Olive 2011; Aubert & Grudnitski 2012) have
shown that, by adoptilrg Ims, the overall financial reponing
prepared by flrms improves significantly.
The Naess introduced upns 7 Financial Instruments:
Disclosure and the requirement to use it came into force on
1st January 20l2.It acts as a new standard to deal with the
disclosure of financial instruments which was previously
coveredby ms 132 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and
Presentation. The decision to defer the implementation was
made to give Malaysia a grace period to learn from other
countries'experiences (uasn 2005) as well as to provide
a sufflcient interval for companies to make necessary
adjustments to their financial reporting (Zadeh & Eskandari
2012). Generally, MFRS 7 provides two main disclosures
that cater the need to disclose the significant level of the
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financial instruments to the entities; and the qualitative
and quantitative information on the exposure of risk faced
to the entities' financial statements. Additionally, MFRS 7
has enhanced the disclosure on fair value measurements
and liquidity risk to address the application issues as well
as to provide sufflcient information to users. The vrms 7
standard is a complementary to both other MFRS standards
which are, MFRS 139 Financial Instruments: Recognition
and Measurement and urns 132 Financial Instruments:
Presentation. However, for the purpose of this study, we
will only focus on MFRS 7.
The aim of this study is to examine the MFRS 7
disclosure practices among Malaysian listed companies
and their compliance level to urns 7. Unlike many
prior studies, FID was examined either^bl using fhe prior
standards such as MAsB 24 (Hassan & Salleh 2010) and
FRS 132 (Othman & Ameer 2009; Zadeh & Eskandari
2012),orby focusing on voluntary disclosure (Bamber &
McMeeking 2010; Ismail & Rahman,2011). This study
extends prior research by focusing on MFRS 7, the current
globally-accepted accounting standard. In addition, this
study complements a study conducted by Amran et al,
(2009) which examined the factors associated with overall
risk reporting, but did not cover the corporate governance
elements. Thus, this study provides additional empirical
evidence to the existing literature by investigating the
relationship between corporate governance using several
revised uccc code in 2012, and the extent of a firm's level
of compliance with the MFRS 7. This paper is organised as
follows: the subsequent section contains reviews of related
literature and hypotheses development. Next, the research
method is deliberately explained, followed by analysis of
results and discussion. The fina1 area will briefly explain
the implication and conclusion of this study.
REvIEw oF RELATED LITSRATURE ANo
Hvpornpses DBwI-opl,mx-r
The pressure of business transactions and the rapid
development of international market have increased
the demand for more relevant information and greater
transparency in financial reporting disclosure (Bischof
2009 ; Savvides & Sawidou 20 12; Elzahar & Hussainey
2012). The risk exposure from financial instruments
and how they are being managed are among the key
elements needed. This detailed information is crucial to
ensure financial statements are prepared to reflect the
true financial position of the firms, and to assist users i.e.
investors to make more informed judgement. Further,
MFRS 7 has been initiated to provide such information
to enable users to evaluate the nature, extent of risks
and the significance of the financial instruments to the
entity's financial position. Prior literature has examined
the financial instruments disclosure practices particularly
on risk-related disclosure covering mandatory, voluntary,
or combination of both types of risk-related disclosure.
Findings indicate that companies tend to comply with the
accounting standards mandated by the respective countries
(Bischof 2009; Hassan & Salleh, 2010; Probohudono,
Tower & Rusmin 2013), while some studies show that
extra disclosure is required to meet the additional rules and
regulation (Bamber & McMeeking 2010). However, it is
also documented that companies tend to partially comply,
by omitting cerlain requirements in the standards (Othman
& Ameer 2009; Sawides & Savvidot 2Ol2; Zadeh &
Eskandari 2012); and the disclosure practices vary in terms
of type of the risk information disclosed, and the in-depth
details of such information in the flnancial reporting (Ismail
& Rahman 2011; Oliveira, Rodrigues & Craig 2OIl).
Empirically, prior studies show that disclosure practices
vary with respect to different settings across counffies.
This was due to different responses coming from various
level of economic development (Probohudono,2013), the
acceptability of each country on risk information (Bischof
2009; Othman & Ameer 2009 ; Sawides & Sawidou 20 1 2)
as well as different level of enforcements and interpretation
of the standards itself (Bischof 2009). Besides,prior studies
suggest that the level of risk disclosure is associated
with corporate governance characteristics (Taylor et al.
2008; Oliveira et al.2011), where flrms with strong CG
structure are more likely to be more effective in financial
risk management, hence promote better transparency in
financial reporting. Similarly, Alanezi and Albuloushi
(2011) revealed that Kuwaiti firms with high level of
compliance with the IFns-mandatory disclosure are more
likely to have good cc structure.
In Malaysia, Hassan and Salleh (2010) examined
the disclosure quality using a self-developed disclosure
index based on MASB 24 requirements; while, Othman
and Ameer (2009) and Zadeh and Eskandai (2012)
employed FRS 132. In general, there are no major areas
and differences between these two standards; as the MASB
standard was just renumbered and renamed (Lazar,Tay
and Othman 2006) to FRS for international convergence
purpose. However, results indicate that there are variation
in the disclosure practices among companies on the nature
and level of compliance to the standard; eventhough
the convergence efforts to align Malaysian accounting
standards to intemational standards already took place in
2006. Thus, it is hoped that the adoption of Ims into MFRS
is able to enhance the compliance level among Malaysian
companies as Malaysian Accounting Standards Board
(MASB) has no power to exempt anyone (i.e. Malaysian
public listed firms) from vrrRS. To strengthen the quality of
financial reporting, the recently-revised trtccc is expected
to enhance the quality of infotmation provided by the firms,
which includes the need for better transparency of financial
reporting and disclosure.
While there is a wide range of studies (Oliveira
et al.2011; Elzahar & Hussainey 2012; Probohudono
et al. 2013) concerning the relationship between cG
mechanism and financial reporting, very little research
has directly investigated or explored the link of cc with
financial instruments disclosure. Hence, the current study
expands existing risk-related literature by investigating the
association of corporate governance mechanism with no
practices among Malaysian companies.At the same time,
this study contributeslo the current literature by examidng
the MFRS 7 disclosure practices among companies.Agency
theory provides a powerful theoretical framework in the
study as flnancial reporting disclosure is among the cost-
effective monitoring tools in principle-agent relationship.
It explains how information asymmetry between the
shareholders (principles) and managers (agents) is
mitigated through monitoring mechanism (Oliveira et al.
201 1) . Furthermore 
, 
compliance with mns promulgated by
the IASB is among the recommended practices to improve
the principal-agent relationship as similar information
would be transmiffed to all parties (uasn 2005).
In this study, monitoring mechanism covers the four
dimensions of corporate governance structure (Cohen,
Krishnamoorthy & Wright 2004) which are comprised of
the board, audit committee, external auditor and intemal
audit functions. The variables used are represented as
board expertise (enxt), audit committee independence
(ecNno), external audit functions (re), audit fees (al), and
intemal audit functions (n), which are consistent with prior
studies (see Taylor et al. 2008; Oliveira et al.2}ll;Elzahar
& Hussainey, 2012; Probohudono et al. 2013). Control
variables are useful in a research to take into consideration
other relevant factors that might influence the variables of
interests. Prior studies suggest that control variables are
related to oversight mechanisms, il association with the
level of disclosure, such as firm-speciflc characteristics.
Therefore, firm size, firm leverage and firm complexity
were used for the purposes ofthis study.
BOARD EXPERTISE (BEXP)
Prior literature recommends that board size affects
board effectiveness in the sense of a larger board being
more likely to have more knowledge and skills (Ismail
and Rahman 20ll;Elzahar and Hussainey 2012),btt
without an appropriate level of expertise among the
board members, it will be a cost instead of a benefit to
the firm. Further, Sulaiman (2013) suggests that the lack
of relevant expertise among the board member could
lead to a failure of a board to exercise its oversight duty,
resulting in loss or damages to the company. Speciflcally,
Sulaiman (2013) highlights the relevance of financial
literacy or expertise among the board as it could improve
board's effectiveness. There is still a limited number of
studies (Sulaiman 2013) that focus on board expertise,
hence, this study extends the literature by including board
expertise as the board has a role in ensuring corporate
disclosure policies are in place. Consistently, the study
predicts that firms with greater number of board members
with accounting or finance expertise would enable them
to better understand the financial reporting elements
associated with better compliance with financial reporting
standards. More specifically, the board with accounting or
finance backgrounds, who by definition would have greater
understanding on flnancial reporting requirements, would
be motivated to ensure the firm is in compliance with the
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mandatory MFRS standards imposed. Similar with past
studies (seeYatim, Kent & Clarkson 2006; Nelson 2010;
Yasin & Nelson 2012), a positive association between
board expertise and the level of compliance with narns 7
is assumed, resulting in the following hypothesis:
H,: There is a positive association between the level of a
firm's compliance with vtms 7 and board expertise
AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE (ACNED)
Given the diversification and complex nature of company,
the board needs to delegate some of its monitoring
responsibilities to another party within the firm, who can
support and provide secondary control over the company
operations (Oliveira et al.20ll). The board generally
delegates financial reporting responsibilities to the audit
committee and hence the audit committee is the mechanism
most likely to provide shareholders with the greatest
protection in maintaining the quality of a company's
financial statements and ensuring the entity complies
with mandatory disclosures (Palmer 2008; Akhtaruddin &
Haron 2010; laCCI 2012 ). Consistent with uccc (2007)
requirements, an effective audit committee needs to be in
place and prior research indicates that the effectiveness
of an audit committee is related to the extent to which the
committee is independent (Oliveira et al.2}ll;Elzahar &
Hussainey 20 1 1 ; Probohudono et al.20l3) . The results of
past studies reveal that a higher proportion ofindependent
directors sitting in the audit committee would lead to
greater monitoring over the board. The greater monitoring
over board includes high compliance with the applicable
standards and regulations imposed on the company
(Palmer, 2008 ; Akhtaruddin & Haron, 20 1 0 ; Oliveira et al.
20ll;Elzahar & Hussainey 2011).Akhtaruddin and Haron,
(2010) also suggest that higher level of compliance with
the mns-required disclosures is found among companies
with higher proportion of non-executive directors serving
on their audit committee. Therefore, it is assumed that
companies with a higher proportion of independent
directors sitting in the audit committee would lead to
a higher level of compliance with lrrns 7. Hence, the
following hypothesis is proposed:
Hr: There is a positive association between audit
committee independence and the 1evel of a firm's
compliance with rrarns 7.
EXTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTIONS (EA)
External auditors have a major role in ensuring that their
clients comply with accounting standards and other
regulations. Some audit committee and board members
are likely to be unaware of all reporting rbquirements
given the increasing complexity of accounting regulation
in recent years (Palmer 2008). Thus, the external auditor
is in a position to ensure that companies comply with
applicable financial reporting requirements. Larger audit
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flrms (i.e. the Big Four) typically have more resources and
experlise (Chen, Hsu, Huang & Yang 2013) as well as behg
more familiar with the applicable reporting requirements
(Palmer 2008); hence engaging with Big Four audit firms
could ensure high compliance with accounting standards
and other regulations. In addition, agency theory predicts
that the larger the company, the more complicated the
organisational structure , and the higher the agency cost
(Jensen & Meckling 1976); thus companies with high
agency costs would tend to engage Big Four hternational
auditing firms due to the higher quality offered (Chen
et al. 2013), Subsequently, these large and well-known
auditing firms (the Big Four) ensure high compliance with
applicable financial reporting standards in order to maintain
the audit firm's reputation (Oliveira et al. 2011) and avoid
reputational costs bome by them (George, Ferguson &
Spear 2013). Consistent with the above flndings, this
study predicts that firms that engage with Big Four audit
firms would tend to have greater compliance with ltpns
7 disclosure requirements than those firms with non-Big
Four audit services . Therefore, to test the impact of external
audit functions on the level of a flrm's disclosure practice,
the following hypothesis is developed:
H.: There is a positive association between firms
audited by Big-Four audit firms and a flrm's level of
compliance with urns 7
AUDITFEES (AF)
Agency theory states that shareholders need to incur
monitoring costs (Jensen & Meckling 1976), such as the
cost of hiring the extemal auditor. This cost is better known
as audit fees and is in place to minimise the agency cost
(Cohen et a1.2004). Moreover, prior studies show that there
is association between fees received by audit firms and the
auditor's independence, which will indirectly impact on the
flnancial reporting decision (i.e. the extent ofdisclosure in
annual reports). It is argued that a higher amount of audit
fees indicates that auditors provide more thorough and
efficient audit services (Yatim et al. 2006). Hence, more
reliable information and a high level of compliance with
accounting standards and other regulations are expected.
Furthermore, George et al. (2013) found a significant
increase in audit cost due to the IFRS adoption by the client
companies. The increase in audit fees is attributed to an
increase in auditing work, as additional effort is needed
by the auditors. They further state that the additional cost
incurred is to mitigate the risk of Ims adoption such as
the possibility of financial statements being materially
misstated or not complying with applicable accounting
standards. In addition, the auditors need to familiarise
themselves with the applicable reporting requirements
(Palmer 2008) and become knowledgeable about the new
IFRS standards (George et aI.2013). This is a cost to the
audit flrms which contributes to higher fees charged to
the clients. Therefore, consistent with above findings, this
study predicts that higher audit fees are associated with
a higher level of compliance with IrlrRs 7 among listed
companies. The following hypothesis is developed to test
this association.
Ho: There is a positive association between audit fees and
the level of a firm's compliance with vrrns 7.
INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTIONS (IA)
Consistent with the revised MCCG (2012), past studies
(Cohen et al.2004; Christopher, Sarens & Leung 2009;
Kueppers & Sullivan 2013; Johl, Johl, Subramaniam
& Cooper 2013) indicate that the independence of
internal audit function is crucial to ensure the internal
auditors are carrying out their function accordingly as
well as to ensure that internal controls are operating
effectively. In addition, the greater the independence
level of intemal audit functions, the greater the likelihood
that the internal auditors can exercise their professional
skepticism and remain objective (Christopher et al.2o09;
Kueppers & Sullivan 2Ol3). Therefore, this suggests
that effective internal audit functions will lead to a high
level of compliance with accounting standards and
other regulations. Further, it is argued that firms that
outsource their internal audit functions are less likely to
be independent in comparison to companies that have their
own in-house internal audit functions. This is because
they may not be fully aware of the overall operation of
the firms, hence, there is a tendency to internal influence
by the management of the firm (Abdolmohammadi 2013),
particularly if the internal auditor is new or has a conflict
of interest, such as in a politically connected flrm (Joh1 et
al.2013). Moreover, the level of independence could be
impaired as they (the outsourced internal audit function)
are beilg employed and paid directly by the company.
However, prior studies also indicate that there are cases
where outsourcing the internal audit functions provide
more benefits to firms. As normally, firms would outsource
their internal audit functions to a professional service
provider, who can provide specialised resources, and thus
be able to strengthen the internal control of the firms.
Similarly, a study by Desai, Gerard and Tripathy (2011)
found that extemal auditors assess the quality of outsourced
tar to be higher than the quality of an in-house tAn and thus
are more willilg to rely (to a greater extent) on outsourced
IAF than in-house IAF. Accordingly, the study predicts
that firms that outsource their internal audit functions are
more likely to comply with vrns requirements, given
firms would outsource their internal audit functions to a
professional service provider (i.e. accounting or auditing
flrms), who are more familiar with m-nsnrarRs standards
and other financial reporting requirements. The following
association is hypothesized.
Hr: There is a negative association between firms that have
their own internal audit functions (in-house) and the
level of the firms'compliance with unns 7
RessaRcn METHoDoLocY
Although year 2012 marked the year for fulI adoption
of rrarns by all public listed companies but there was an
exception granted for several companies such as those
entities that are within the scope of urRs 141 Agriculture
(urns 141) and IC Interpretation 15 Agreements for
Consffuction of Real Estate (Ic 15). In this case, these
transitioning entities will be excluded in the sample
as they are allowed to defer the adoption for another 2
years. Moreover, consistent with prior studies (Bamber
& McMeeking2010; Ismail & Rahman 2OlI1,Elzahar
& Hussainey 2012), ihe sample also excludes financial
industry due to different regulation attached to this sector,
thus, the flnal sample consists of 319 companies. Data was
hand collected from available annual reports gn Bursa
Malaysia website. This study employed the unweighted
index or dichotomous scores whereby all information
was equally valued regardless of the number of words,
sentences, or the length of pages. The Financial lnstrument
Disclosure Checklist (r'lo) contains atotal of 25 checklist
items, which was self-developed based on the MFRS 7
requirements. The items disclosed are coded as 'f if a
particular item is included in the checklist while '0' is
coded if not disclosed, consistent with prior studies (see
Tayloret al.2008; Othman andAmeer2009; Sawides and
Sawodiu 2012;Probohudono et al.2Ol3). The variables
of measurements used are based on prior academic
literature or relevant regulatory requirements (i.e., the
uccc code). Table 1 below represents the summary of the
operationalisation ofvariables used in this study. They have
been categorised into three types, which are dependent
variables, independent variables and control variables.
RESULTSAND FINDINGS
Table 2 shows the overall mean score for rn is 80.767o,
with the minimum and maximum score of l4%o and ljo%io
respectively. The results show that the disclosure level of
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Malaysian companies has slightly increased compared to
prior studies by Othman and$.meer (2009) andZadeh and
Eskandari (2012). For the independent variables, they are
mainly categorised into two sections, Panel Areports those
for continuous variables, which includes the values of the
mean, minimum, maximum and standard deviation values
of the variables, while, Panel B represents the frequency
of dichotomous variables.
The revised trlccc code (uccc 2012) focuses on
strengthening the roles and responsibilities of the board
by having the appropriate composition of board members
with the relevant expertise. In addition, in a dynamic and
complex business environment, it is crucial for the directors
in the board to have a certain level of accounting-related
knowledge and to enhance their skills through appropriate
continuing education programmers. This will enable the
board to serve and sustain their active participation in
board deliberations effectively (MCCG 2Ol2). The data
collected in this study have shown that on average,Z8%o
of the board members have an accounting background
and/or accounting-related experience. The maximum
and minimum percentages of board members with an
accounting background or accounting-related experience
ar e SOVo and 0 7o, respectively.
Furthermore, it is a recommended practice under the
MCCG 2007 for Malaysian companies to establish an audit
committee, of which a portion comprises the directors
in the board and the majority of the members need to be
independent non-executive directors. The role ofthe audit
committee is to provide further support to the board; hence,
its members should be independent in order to discharge
their functions effectively. The finding reveals one company
failed to comply with the MCCG (2007) recommendations,
given the minimum amount of 0 obtained from the acNeo
variable results. This company mentioned in their annual
report that they had not established any audit committee
team but would rather outsource it to their parent company.
However, it is permissible not to have audit committee for
TABLE 1. Summary of Variables
Operational Measures Acronym
Independent Variable
Board Expertise
Audit Committee
Independence
Extemal Auditor
Extemal Audit Fee
Internal Audit
Functions
Control Variables
Firm Size
Firm Leverage
Firm Complexity
The proportion of board members with accounting background or accounting
related experience
The proportion of independent non-executive directors (INED) in the audit
committee team;
Assigned aslfor firm's auditedby Big-Four and0 for firm's audited by non-Big Four
Natural 1og of total value of audit fees paid to the external auditors by the firms
Assigned as I for in-house internal audit functions and 0 for outsourced intemal
audit functions
Natural log of firm size based on market capitalisation
Total value of debt to total assets
Number of direct subsidiaries
EA
AF
IA
BEXP
ACNED
FSIZE
FLEV
FCOMPLEX
TABLE?. Descriptive analysis for all variables
Min Max Mean Std. Deviation
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
MFRS Disclosure Index (FID)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Panel A- Continuous Variable
BEXP(%)
ACNED
AF
FSIZE
FLEV
FCOMPLEX
Panel B- Dicltotomous Variable
EA
IA
3
(t4Vo)
0.00
0.00
8000
t,949J00
0.03
0
Freq (Big 4)
" 173
Freq (In-house)
t63
25
(r00%)
0.80
1.00
5,274,000
56,069,660$72
1.69
101
%
54.20
Vo
51.10
20.t9
(80.76%)
0.28
0.86
381,3'73.57
1,8st707 432
0.40
9.93
Freq (Non-Big 4)
t46
Freq (Outsource)
r55
o.l4
0.17
675,230.61
6,947,662596
0.23
12.99
7o
45.8
Vo
48.60
this type of company as it falls underreal estate investment
trust; hence, audit committees are not applicable (Bursa
Malaysia, 2013). On the other hands, the maximum of
lOO7o for ACNED indicates that all members sitting on the
audit committee functions are independent non-executive
directors , but , on average , the result obtained is 867o .
With regard to external auditors, on average 54.2OVo
of the companies, or a total of 173 companies, engaged
the services of one of the Big Four audit firms, while
the rest (45.807o) engaged a non-Big Four audit firm. In
addition, to provide assurance to the board that the htemal
controls are operating effectively, the MCCG 2012 further
enhances the govemance practices which outline the need
to establish intemal audit functions reporting directly to the
audit committee. However, based on the flndings obtained,
only 51.107o or a total of 163 from the total sample, have
in-house intemal audit functions while the rest outsource
their internal audit functions to the outsiders.
For control variables, the mean for firm size is nu
1,85I,707,432, which is proxied by market capitalisation,
with a rninimum amount of rul 1 949 J00 and a maximum
amount of nu 56069,660,672. The next variable used is
firm leverage. Firm leverage is computed based on total
liabilities over total assets; the mean obtained is 0 47o , while
the maximum and minimum amounts arc 1.697o and0 .03Vo
respectively. Finally, the number of direct subsidies ranges
from0to 101,withamean of 9.93.
In Table 3, the correlation analysis indicates that there
is no evidence of high collinearity among the variables.
The overall correlation analysis between dependent and
independent variables suggests that MFRS 7 on financial
instruments disclosure (no) is positively and significantly
correlated with extemal audit (eA) and audit fees (nr)
at O.lll arrd 0.297 , respectively, while it is insignificant
with the rest of independent variables which include board
expertise (ene), audit committee ildependence (ecIxo)
and internal audit functions (ra). This result suggests
that external auditors play a major role in ensuring high
compliance among companies as they (extemal auditors)
are expected to be more familiar with the reporting
requirements. Some clients are likely to be unaware of all
reporting requirements given the increasing complexity
of accounting regulations in recent years (Palmer 2008).
Hence, the external auditors are in a position to provide
reasonable assurance that the flnancial statement is prepared
in accordance with the applicable ums standards and other
regulations. Specifically, the finding indicates that f,rms
that engage Big Four audit flrms or, to some extent, firms
with high audit fees tend to comply with urns 7 disclosure
requirements, as compared to firms that employ non-Big
Four audit services or ones which charge a lower audit
fee. Further, the correlation table provides the correlation
analysis between the dependent variable and the control
variables. The result signifles that each of the control
variables (FSIZE, rLBV and FCoMPLEX) is positively and
signiflcantly correlates with vnns 7 on financial instrument
disclosure (no)
On the other hand, the highest level of correlation
among the independent variables (at l%o level) exists
between external auditor (ee) and audit committee
independence (-0.204), between audit fees (ar) and ne
(0.424), and between internal audit functions (Ie) with na
and er, which represent 0.187 and}.323 respectively. There
is a significant relationship between all the independent
variables and firm size (audit independence at -0.213;
external audit functions at 0.454; audit fees at 0.618 and
internal audit functions at} .323) except for board expertise
(-0.095). Similarly, for firm's complexity, which is proxied
by the number of direct subsidiaries, the result indicates
that there is a significant correlation with all independent
variables except board expertise (-0.009.) and audit
committee independence (-0.081). The figures are 0.163 for
external audit functions,0.530 for audit fees and 0.253 for
internal audit functions. Moreover, only audit fee (0.287) is
found to be highly correlated to the firm's leverage, while the
rest of independent variables are found to be insignificant.
TABLE 3. Results of Correlation Analysis
FID (7o) ACNED FCOMPLEX
FrD(%)
BEXP
ACNED
EA
AF
IA
FSIZE
FLEV
FCOMPLEX
-0.079
1
0.059 0.177** 0.297** _0.004
-0.028 -0.087 0.011 -0.094
| _0.204** _0.135+ _0.052
I 0.424** 0.187**
| 0.323**
1
0.180** 0.201**0.198**
-0.095
-0.273**
0.454**
0.618 * x
0.323**
1
0.052
-0.055
0.003
0.094
0.029
1
-0.009
-0.081
0.163**
0.253**
0.353**
0.1 80**
1
0.287** 0.530**
*+, * Conelation is significant level at lqa and 5 % respectively level (2-tailed)
Note: FID= The percentage of MFRS 7 finmcial insftuments disclosure items BEXP= The proportion of board members with accounting background or accounting
related experience;ACNED: The proportion of independent non-executive directors (INED) in the audit comittee temt AF: Natmal log of total value of audit fees paid
to the extemal auditors by the fims; EA: Assigned aslfor fim's audited by Big Four and 0 for fim's audited by non-Big Four; IA: Assigned as I for in-house intemal
audit functions and 0 for outsourced intemal audit functions; FSIZE: Natural log of fim size based on market capitalisation; FLEV: Total value of debt to total assets;
FCOMPLEX: Number of direct subsidiaies
Table 4 provides a summary analysis of the multiple
regression results obtained for this study. The F-value of
the data is 6.698 and is statistically signiflcant at l%olevel,
with the p-value of 0.000. Further, the explanatory power
of the entire set of variables for this study is estimated by
the adjusted R2 figures. The R2 value is the coefficient of
determination; in this case, the R2 is represented by 15.4
Vo.It l:ndicates that !5.47o of variation in the dependent
variable is explained by the variation ir the independent
variables. In other words, it measures the degree of
predictive accuracy ofthe regression model in explaining
the variation in the dependent variable. Although the R2 is
reporled as having a low value, this seems consistent with
prior studies in this flnancial reporting disclosure area, such
as Hassan, Saleh andRahman (2008), Said,Zainuddin and
Haron (2009) andAkhtaruddin and Haron (2010). The R2
values for all these studies are reported at15.6'77a,137o
and 12.2 70 respectively
The overall regression results show that two variables
which are audit committee independence (acNno) and
external audit (m) are significant and positively associated,
while, internal audit (m) is found to be negatively
associated with the extent of ums 7 disclosure practices
among the selected sample. For the rest of the independent
variables and control variables, they are found to be
insigniflcant in this study. External audit functions (re)
is the only variable that is strongly supported since it also
shows a significant positive conelation in the correlation
analysis, while the other two variables (ecNro and m)
are not significantly correlated with the extent of MFRS 7
disclosure practices.
The largest beta coeff,cient in this study is 0.276,
which represents the external audit (pa) variables. This
indicates that external audit function makes the strongest
conffibution in explaining the dependent variable (nrl).
Consistently, the p-value for EA shows a significant value
atl%olevel,which indicates the selection of external audit
functions (Big Four or non-Big Four audit firms) is found to
be positively associated with the firm's level of compliance
with rvrms 7. Thus, H, is supported. The result is consistent
with prior studies (see Oliveira et al.2011; George et al.
20 1 3 ; Chen et al. 2013) . External auditors play a valuable
role in monitoring the conffactual relationship between
the entity and its stakeholders, as the auditor's verification
provides greater assurance about companies' annual
reports (xrnac 2Ol2), and hence, reduces the information
asymmetry in the agency relationship. Further, some audit
committee and board members are likely to be unaware of
all reporting requirements given the increasing complexity
of accounting regulation in recent years (Palmer 2008).
Thus, the external auditor is in a position to provide
independent advice andensure that companies comply with
applicable fi nancial reporting requirements (Palmer 2008).
Hence, external auditors are expected to be independent,
qualified and competent to carry out their duties in order to
maintain the quality of audit services offered. Based on the
flndings, Big Four audit firms are more likely to ensure high
compliance with applicable accounting standards among
their clients as compared to non-Big Four firms, as they
are internationally recognised, and have more resources
and expertise (Chen et al,2013).
Similarly, the finding is consistent with agency theory
prediction in which the larger the company, the more
complicated the organisational structure, and the higher
the agency cost. Thus, companies (with higher agency
costs) would tend to engage Big Four auditing firms due
to the higher quality of service offered (Jensen & Meckling
1976). Subsequently, these large and well-known auditing
flrms (the Big Four) will ensure high compliance with
applicable financial reporting standards among their clients
in order to maintain the audit firm's reputation (Oliveira
et al.20ll) and avoid reputational costs borne by them
(George et al. 2013). Therefore, f,rms that engage Big Four
audit firms would have a greater tendency to comply with
MFRS 7 disclosure requirements than flrms with a non-Big
Four audit service
TABLE 4. Multivariate Regression Analysis
FID=00 + Bl BEXP + [32 ACNED + l]3 EA + B4AF+ B5 IA + 136 FSIZE + B7 FLEV+ BBFCOMPLEX + e
Variable Beta/Coefflcients Significant(t-stat) (p-value )
Independent Variables
Control Variables
R2
Adjusted R3
F-value
p-value
N
(Constant)
BEXP
ACNED
EA
AF
IA
FSIZE
FLEV
FCOMPLEX
0.154
0.131
6.698
0.000***3
319
0.056
0.121
0.276
0.076
-0.176
0.053
0.090
0.067
5.042
-1.030
2.t46
3.289
t.214
-3.011
0.699
t.557
0.067
.000
0.304
0.033**
0.001* *< *
0.226
0.003**x
0.485
0.121
o.067
x+E, **significant at 1Eo and 5% respectively.
Note: FID= The percentage of MFRS 7 financial instruments disclosure items BEXP= The proportion of board members with
accounting background or accounting related experience; ACNED: The proportion of independent non-executive directors (INED)
in the audit committee team; AF: Natural 1og of total value of audit fees paid to the external auditors by the flrms; EA: Assigned
aslfor firm's audited by Big Four and 0 for film's audited by non-Big Four; IA: Assigned as 1 for in-house intemal audit functions
and 0 for outsourced internal audit functions; FSIZE: Natural log of firm size based on market capitalisation; FLEV: Total value of
debt to total assets: FCOMPLEX: Number of direct subsidiaries
The MCCG (2007,2012) highlights the need for
an internal audit function to be independent, reliable
and functioning in a timely manner. Consistently, the
regression results obtained from the study suggest that the
internal audit function (n) appears to be able to influence
the extent of firm's disclosure practices, although, the
correlation analysis shows an insigniflcant correlation
between internal audit functions (n) and firm's disclosure
practices (rro). The p-value and t-stat value for the intemal
audit (IA) variable are 0.003 and -3.011 respectively,
hence, it shows a negative association at l7o level.
Previously, the correlation analysis shows insignificant
results as it is based on a linear relationship between
the two variables (m and FID only), while the regression
analysis allows a more sophisticated exploration by
taking into consideration the interrelationship among
the set of other dependent variables (i.e. BEXP, ACNED,
EA, AF) within the study. For that reason, regression
results are considered more absolute and ideal as they
take into consideration the complexity of business by
providing information about the model as a whole and
the relative contribution of each variable used to make
up the model. In view of this, H, is supported, as the
regression results suggest that firms that outsource their
internal audit functions to a professional service provider
(i.e 
. an auditing or accounting flrm) tends to comply more
with rr,rnRs 7 as compared to firms that have their own
in-house internal audit functions. This is consistent with
prior. studies (see Desai et al.20ll; Abdolmohammadi
2013) but contradicts with the revised MCCG (2012)
recommendations. The revised MCCG (2012) states that
companies should establish an internal audit function
as one of the mechanisms to recognise and manage the
risk. Hence, the regulators or standard setters would
benefit from these findings as they shall consider the
practicality of recommending an in-house internal audit
function. Based on the flndings from the study, it shows
that firms that outsource their internal audit functions to
a professional service provider are more likely to comply
with ltrns 7 as compared to firms with in-house internal
audit functions. In other words, outsourced internal audit
functions provide better monitoring control as compared
to in-house internal audit functions
Furthermore, several past studies (Christopher et al.
2009; Kueppers & Sullivan 2013) have empirically proved
that the outsourced internal audit function is more likely
to be independent as compared to the in-house internal
audit function. The internal audit function needs to be
independent to ensure the internal controls are operating
effectively. The greater the independence level of the
internal audit functions, the greater the likelihood that the
ilternal auditors can exercise their professional skepticism
and remain objective (Christopher et al.2009; Kueppers
& Sullivan 2013). Moreover, firms would outsource their
internal audit functions to a professional seryice provider,
who can provide specialised resources, such as an auditing
or accounting firm (Desai et al. 2011;Abdolmohammadi
2013). Thus, they should have the relevant qualification
and appropriate experience that enable them to provide
assurance to their clients that the internal controls are
operating effectively. Effective internal controls include
ensuring the financial reporting process (uccc 2012)
is in place, subsequently contributing to a high level of
compliance with the applicable standards in the company.
Similarly, the correlation analysis found a non-
signifi cant relationship with audit committee independence,
and this is supported in regression analysis. Therefore, H, is
supported. This posits that audit committee independence
(ecweo) is not a stand-alone variable as ithas apositive and
significant association with the extent of firms' disclosure
at 5Vo level after taking into consideration other dependent
variables in the regression model. Audit committee
independence is proxied by the propofiion of independent
non-executive directors (INno) on the audit committee
team. Hence, it indicates that the higher the proportion of
independent non-executives directors in the audit committee,
the higher the probability of flrms' compliance with lnns
7 disclosure requirements. This is consistent with the
recommendation of the MCCG (2007), that every public
company should establish an audit comntittee comprising at
least three members, the majority of whom are independent
directors. Moreover, prior studies (see Oliveira et al.20ll;
Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010; Probohudono et al.2013)
suggest that when there are more independent directors
on the audit committee, it is likely that there will be more
effective board monitoring. Hence, this would lead to a
higher level of disclosure and indirectly contribute to a
higher level of urns 7 compliance in companies.
Moreover, among the aims of the revised uccc (2012)
is to strengthen the board structure and its composition,
which includes having qualified and competent board
members to manage the business operation effectively. An
appropriate level ofknowledge and adequate experience in
accounting and finance are viewed as among the essential
elements for the board members (Nelson 2010). However,
the regression result in this study rejects H,, as it indicates
that no significant association exists between board expertise
and the extent of lrylns Tdisclosure. This is consistent with
Yasin and Nelson (2012) afi could possibly be auributed
to the minimal recommendation in the MCCG already
being sufficient for Malaysian companies. The MCCG code
recommends only that all members of the audit committee
to be financially literate and that at least one should be a
member of an accounting association or body. Therefore,
the findings would be useful for regulators and companies
to ensure the balanced structure of a board, as any excess
or deficiency is a cost rather than a benefit to the flrm. In
contrast to the correlation results, the regression results
found an insignificant relationship between the audit fee
and the extent of MFRS 7 disclosure; thus Ho is rejected.
Ho predicted that the higher the amount of audit fees, the
more thorough and efficient the audit services offered by
the external auditors. In other words, there is a positive
association between audit fee and the level of a flrm's
disclosure. However, the result in this study reveals a weak
association between these variables. The result contradicts
with George and Ferguson (2013), who claim that there
has been a significant increase in audit fees due to the new
IFRS implementation as more auditing works are needed.
This contrasting result could be due to auditing fees having
a minimal impact on the level of disclosure and that there
are other relevant factors influencing the level ofdisclosure,
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which should be considered by companies. Moreover, this
study suggests that companies should consider a reasonable
audit fee to ensure the balance of cost and beneflt received
by companies.
Nevertheless, the regression and the correlation analysis
for the control variables (FSIZE, FLEv and FCoMPEx)
show inconsistent results. The initial correlation results
indicate that all the control variables are correlated with
the dependent variable (no), but, in the regression analysis,
none of the control variables shows a significant relationship.
Therefore, this signifies that although each conffol variable
correlates to the firm's disclosure practice, the impact is
minimal and insigniflcant to the overall regression model.
This is consistent with several prior studies (Hassan 2009;
Oliveira et al. 2}ll;Miihkinen 2DlZ;Elzahar & Hussainey
2012).
CONCLUSION
The study provides recent empirical evidence on the MFRS
7 disclosure practices among Malaysian listed companies.
In general, most Malaysian companies comply with vrnns
7, though some requirements are omitted such as hedge
accounting information. This is consistent with Othman
and Ameer (2009) who documented low level of hedge
information due to the less involvement with hedging
activities among Malaysian companies. The adoption
of agency theory in this study suggests that mandatory
disclosure is needed but will be effective only with
the establishment of effective corporate governance
and proper enforcement in place. Effective corporate
governance (agents) is required to ensure adequate
disclosures are made, resulting in the overall quality of
financial reporting and ultimately protecting the interest
of the shareholders (principals). Specifically, the results
indicate that internal and external audit functions play
a vital role in supporting the audit committee to ensure
a high level of compliance and greater transparency of
financial reporting disclosures. The findings are consistent
with uccc recommendations, which propose that audit
committee members need to be independent in order to
discharge their duties effectively and to strengthen the
role of the auditing function within the flrm. This study
could be useful to regulators, standard setters , companies
and market players in general as it empirically examines
the impact of new MFRS adoption on the disclosure
practices of Malaysian companies as well as highlighting
the role of corporate governance in enhancing the level
of corporate reporting disclosure. However, this study is
subject to several limitations, such as the exclusion of the
finance-related industry, and the limited data and research
methods used which could be extended il future research.
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APPENDIX
Item MFRS 7 on Financial lnstrunents Disclosure (FID) checklists
No
A) Overview of MFRS 7
1 Disclosure of relevant scope of MFRS standards used for financiai instruments
Classes of financial instruments and level of disclosure
2 - Categorisation of each financial instrument based on its nature & characteristics
3 - Initial recognition and measurements ofeach financial instruments
4 - Subsequent recognitions and measurements
B) Significance of financial instruments for flnancial position and performance
Financial Position
5 a) Categories of financial assets and flnancial liabilities
6 b) The extent and nature of each underlying financial instrument,
7 c) Significant tems and conditions that may affect the financial instruments
8 d) Accounting policies and method adopted, including criteria for recognition and basis of measurement applied
9 a) Disclosethefollowingitemsofincome,expense,gainsorlosseseitherinthestatementofcomprehensiveincomeorinthe
notes.
Other Disclosures
a) DiscloseeachtypeofhedgedescribedinMFRS l39,theirfairvaluesattheendof reportingperiodandthenatureof therisks
being hedged
Type of hedge as described in MFRS 139
Fair Values of hedge accounting at the end of reporting period
Describe the nature of the risk being hedged
b) Disclose the fair values measurements using a fair value hierarchy; including the methods used, valuation techniques as well
as the assumptions applied in determining the fair values of each flnancial instruments
Fair value measurements using a fair value hierarchy
Method and valuation techniques used
Assumptions applied in determining the fair value
C) Nature and extent of risks arising from financial instruments
Oualitative Disclosures
Credit Risk
a) the exposure to the risk and how it arises;
b) its objectives, policies and process for managing the risk and the method used to measure the risk; and any changes from the
previous period
Liquidity risk
18 a) theexposuretotheriskandhowitarises;
19 b) its objectives, policies and process for managing the risk and the method used to measure the risk; and any changes from the
previous period
Market Risk
20 a) the exposure to the risk and how it arises;
2l b) its objectives, policies and process for managing the risk and the method used to measure the risk; and any changes from the
previous period
Ouantitative Disclosures
Credit risk information
22 The amount that best represents financial instruments' maximum credit risk exposure
23 Significance concenfations of credit risks for each class of financial instruments
Liquidity risk information
24 Maturity analysis for derivative and non-derivative financial liabilities including flnancial guarantee contracts; and description of
how it manages the liquidity risk.
Market risk information
25 Sensitivity analysis for each type of market risk, the methods and assumption used, as well as any changes from prior period, with
the asons for such changes
Score
I
I
1
1
1
t0
11
t2
13
t4
15
t6
t'7
* Source: MFRS 7 on Financial Instruments: Disclosures
